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CASE COMMENT
TORT LAW: FLORIDA TAKES ANOTHER STEP TOWARDS
ABANDONING THE PROFESSIONAL PRIVITY REQUIREMENT
Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995)
John G. Crivei*
The petitioner, Heidi Pate, filed suit against the respondents, Doctor
James Threlkel and his respective employers, for negligent failure to
warn of a genetic disease transference.' Three years prior, respondent
Doctor Threlkel treated petitioner's mother for medullary thyroid
carcinoma, a genetically transferable cancer, but failed to warn of the
possibility that her children might contract the disease in the future.2
The petitioner filed suit upon discovering the familial link between the
two conditions The complaint alleged the "physician knew or should
have known" of the risk that petitioner would inherit the deadly cancer;4
therefore, the respondents had an affirmative duty to recommend
immediate testing for the patient's children.' Petitioner claimed she
would have taken preventive steps to cure the disease at an early stage
in its development had she been armed with an adequate warning.6
At trial, respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, pointing out
the petitioner's failure to allege the existence of a professional
relationship between the parties.7 Respondents argued that in the
absence of privity no action can be maintained for negligence in
rendering medical services The trial court agreed and granted the
motion, finding that petitioner was not currently a patient of respondent
nor had she ever been in the past.9 Additionally, the court noted that
petitioner's cause of action did not fit within any recognized exception
* Dedicated to my parents, Larry and Enza Crivelli.
1. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 278 (Fla. 1995).

2. Id.
3. Id at 279. The complaint also included counts against the hospital where appellant's

mother had been treated for the cancer. Threlkel, 640 So. 2d at 183 n.1.
4. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 279.
5. Id.
6. Id. The original complaint alleged that appellant suffered from an advanced form of

medullary thyroid carcinoma as a proximate result of the doctor's failure to warn the mother.
Threlkel, 640 So. 2d at 183.
7. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 279.
8. Id.

9. Id.
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to the professional privity requirement. ° The Florida First District
Court of Appeal affirmed, but certified to the Florida Supreme Court the
issue of whether a physician's duty of care extends to the children of a
patient with whom the physician is not in privity of contract." The
Florida Supreme Court reversed and HELD, that a physician may owe
a legal duty to the children of a patient if the children are identified
beneficiaries of the prevailing standard of care. 2
Ordinarily, maintaining an action in negligence requires establishing
a duty of care from defendant to plaintiff. 3 Courts will usually impose
such a duty when defendant engages in behavior creating a foreseeable
zone of risk that injury will occur if precautions are not taken. 4 Additionally, courts will consider various factors such as capacity of the
parties to bear the loss, moral blameworthiness, and changing social
conditions. 5 With regard to claims of negligence against manufacturers
and professional service providers, however, the traditional common law
rule required contractual privity between the parties as a condition
precedent to maintaining the action, notwithstanding the foreseeability
of risk that injury will occur. 6 Essentially, the existing "contract"
between the parties limited the scope of duty to include only the
client, 7 automatically classifying injured third parties as unforeseeable
victims. 8

10. Id. at 279-80. At the time appellant filed her complaint the only recognized exception
to the doctor-patient privity rule existed in the context of a contagious disease afflicting third
parties. See Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (4th DCA 1970), cert. denied, 245 So.
2d 257 (Fla. 1971); Gill v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 337 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 2d DCA
1976).
11. Threlkel, 640 So. 2d at 186.
12. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 282.
13. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164
(5th ed. 1984).
14. See id. § 53, at 358; see also Joyce v. Nash, 630 S.W.2d 219, 222-25 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) (holding that the harm was too unforeseeable to justify imposing a duty); Anderson v.
Green Bay & W. R.R., 299 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (establishing a duty when
a risk of harm is reasonably foreseeable); Hale v. Crestline Realty, Inc., 173 A.2d 500, 502
(Conn. 1961) (holding no duty owed to trespasser's unforeseeable injury).
15. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 53, at 359.
16. See Mary E. Phelan, Unleashing the Limits on Lawyers' Liability? Mieras v. Debona:
Michigan Joins the Mainstream andAbrogates the Privity Requirement in Attorney-Malpractice
Cases Involving Negligent Will Drafting, 72 U. DE-. MERCY L. REV. 327 (1995); see also
Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 205-06 (1879) (holding that in the context of the attorneyclient relationship there could be no tort liability in the absence of privity).
17. See Kevin L. Kelley, Casenote, NEGLIGENCE-THIRD PARTY LIABILITY-Physician Owes Duty of Care to Third Party When His Negligence in Failing to Warn
Patient Not to Drive Contributes to Third Party's Injury, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 493, 494 (1984).
18. See Steven K. Ward, ProfessionalMalpractice: The Extent of Liability in Texas and
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Early applications of the privity rule precluded many injured victims
from successfully filing claims in various contexts, including
professional malpractice." In order to eliminate some of the inequities
associated with the privity rule and to facilitate recovery for injured
plaintiffs, courts slowly began to abandon the privity requirement in
favor of a more flexible foreseeability standard.' In the landmark case
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,2 Justice Cardozo adopted a
foreseeability test to determine the scope of duty owed by a
manufacturer to a third party injured by a defective product.' Soon after, other jurisdictions followed suit and abandoned the privity requirement, applying the foreseeability test to determine the precise scope of
a defendant's duty.' In fact, the decline of the privity doctrine was
viewed as "the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an
established rule in the entire history of the law of torts."'24
In the area of professional malpractice, however, Florida courts have
been reluctant to completely abrogate the privity rule.25 This hesitation
may reflect a desire to insulate professional service providers from tort
liability arising out of injury to parties with whom the professionals are
not in privity of contract. Nonetheless, Florida courts have crafted
certain exceptions to the privity rule for plaintiffs in "near privity" with

Elsewhere, 42 TrX. B.J. 117, 120 (1979).
19. See Phelan, supra note 16, at 328; see also Buckley v. Gray, 42 P. 900, 900, 902 (Cal.
1895), overruled by Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (disallowing third party
claim against attorney for negligent will drafting).
20. See Phelan, supra note 16, at 328;
21. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
22. Id. at 1053. But see Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (N.Y. 1931)
(refusing to hold accountant liable to foreseeable third party, and instead relying on privity
requirement).
23. See Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193-94 (D. Neb. 1980) (ruling
that lack of privity did not bar action against therapist for failure to control patient); Detweiler
Bros. v. John Graham & Co., 412 F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D. Wash. 1976) (holding that a lack of
privity did not bar third party suit against architect); Peerless Ins. Co. v. Cerney & Assoc., 199
F. Supp. 951, 955 (D. Minn. 1961) (allowing a surety to sue a negligent architect despite the
absence of privity); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334,340 (Cal. 1976) (holding
that psychiatrist has a duty to warn potential victims of a plaintiffs hostile intentions);
Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 222 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ill. Ct. App. 1966) (stating that lack of
privity does not bar negligence action against engineers by third party); Inman v. Binghamton
Housing Auth., 143 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1957) (stating that architects and builders may be held
accountable in negligence for injuries to third parties despite the absence of privity).
24. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 14-15 (4th ed. 1971).
25. See, e.g., Weimar v. Yacht Club Point Estates, Inc., 223 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1969) (stating that when the duty allegedly breached is one created by contract, privity of
contract must exist between the person charged with negligence and the person injured by such
breach).
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the professional, that is, when the victim of malpractice is either an
intended beneficiary of the contract between
6 the professional and the
client, or is otherwise related to the client.1
One of the first Florida cases to allow recovery in negligence for a
plaintiff not in privity of contract with the professional was Hofinann v.
Blackmon27 in which the court imposed a duty on a physician to warn
a patient's family members of a contagious disease." In Hofinann, the
physician treated a sick patient for almost two years, yet negligently
failed to diagnose the ailment as tuberculosis.29 Within that time frame,
the plaintiff, the patient's two-year-old child contracted the same illness.3" After being formally diagnosed with tuberculosis,3 the minor
filed suit against the doctor for negligence in failing to discover the
father's ailment and warn the family of its contagious nature.32 The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the doctor because the
parties were not in privity of contract.33
On appeal, the issue was whether the doctor's duty of care extended
to the family members of the sick patient.34 In reversing the lower
court's summary judgment, the appellate court abandoned the privity
rule and allowed the plaintiff's cause of action to move forward.35 To
ensure adequate protection from the dangers of communicable diseases,
the court extended the physician's duty of care directly to the family
members despite the lack of a professional relationship.36 The court
reasoned that discovering a communicable disease creates a duty for
doctors to use reasonable care in warning and advising a patient's family
of the dangers associated with such diseases.37 However, the court

26. See Pate, 661 So. 2d at 282; Hofinann, 241 So. 2d at 753.
27. Hofmann, 241 So. 2d at 753.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The child was the first to be diagnosed with tuberculosis; after the child was
diagnosed, the father's condition was then diagnosed. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see Andrew C. Greenberg, Note, FloridaRejects a Tarasoff Duty to Protect, 22
STETSON L. REV. 239, 247 (1992).

36. Hofinann, 241 So. 2d at 753. The court failed to outline any major policy
considerations. Instead, the court cited to persuasive authority that dealt with the issue of
communicable disease in more detail. Id. For a general discussion of physician liability to third
parties in the area of contagious diseases, see Tracey A. Bateman, Annotation, Liability of
Doctor or Other Health Care Practitionerto Third Party Contracting Contagious Diseasefrom
Doctor's Patient,3 A.L.R.5th 370 (1992).
37. Hofinann, 241 So. 2d at 753.
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constricted the impact of its holding by limiting recovery to family
members living with the afflicted patient.38 Consequently, victims
unrelated to the physician's patient would still be barred from bringing
an action against the physician.
Nearly six years after Hofinann, in McAbee v. Edwards,39 the
Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal once again abandoned the
privity rule except in this instance the context was attorney malpractice.4" In McAbee, the plaintiff sued her mother's attorney for damages
occasioned by the attorney's negligent failure to update the mother's
will. The plaintiff's mother had previously hired the attorney to prepare
a will which would transfer her entire estate to the plaintiff.41 Shortly
thereafter, the plaintiff's mother decided to get married and requested
the attorney to redraft the will to ensure that the plaintiff would still
receive the entire estate.42 The attorney advised the mother that changes
to the will would be unnecessary to effectuate her testamentary plan but
failed to consider the Florida pretermitted spouse statute.43 When the
will was eventually probated, operation of the pretermitted spouse
statute significantly reduced the plaintiffs inheritance, prompting the
plaintiff to file an action in negligence." The lawyer moved for
judgment on the pleadings based in part on the lack of privity between
the parties and the trial court granted the motion.45
On appeal, the McAbee court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions
which addressed scope of an attorney's duty of care to persons with
whom the attorney is not in privity of contract.46 Although the court
conceded that the weight of this authority favored affirming the lower
court's decision, it decided to adopt a multi-part balancing test from a
California case to replace the privity rule in the context of negligent
estate planning.' The new test focused on the degree to which the

38. Id.
39. 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
40. Id. at 1168. For an in depth discussion of attorney liability to third party plaintiffs in
the will context, see Phelan, supra note 16.
41. McAbee, 340 So. 2d at 1168.
42. Id. The testator requested the attorney to prepare a new document ensuring that the
daughter would receive the entire estate, but the attorney insisted that the previous will would
carry out the testator's desires. Id.

43. Id. at 1168 n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 731.10 (1973)).
44. Id. In Florida, when a testator marries after executing a will, and the spouse survives
the testator, the spouse is entitled an intestate share of the testator's estate. Id. The only way to
bypass this statute is to make some type of provision in the will, or by marriage contract, or if
the will manifests an intention not to provide for the spouse. Id.
45. Id. at 1168. The spouse's claim was eventually settled out of court for $27,000. Id.
46. Id. at 1169 (citing Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 164-65 (Cal. 1969)).
47. Id. (citing Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 164-65 (Cal. 1969)).
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transaction was intended to benefit an identified third party, namely the
disappointed will beneficiary, to determine whether recovery should be
allowed in the absence of privity.4" Applying this analysis to the facts
of McAbee, the court concluded that the attorney owed a duty of care
to the disappointed will beneficiary.49 The benefit of the will flowed
directly to the plaintiff, an identified third party, and the harm was
foreseeable. 0 Thus, the original complaint stated a valid cause of action."
Both public health concerns in Hofinann and benefits to third parties
in McAbee lead to judicial abandonment of the professional privity
requirement." However, in Joseph v. Shafey 3 the court declined to
follow the trend of abandoning privity when faced with a claim for
medical malpractice by a plaintiff who was not in near privity with the
physician. 4 In Joseph, a physician surgically removed a pituitary gland
tumor from a police officer. 5 The patient subsequently experienced a
variety of "psychotic episodes" as a result of the operation. 6 The
doctor attempted to cure the condition with anti-psychotic medication
and after two months of treatment recommended that the officer resume
his normal duties at work. 7 Shortly thereafter, while on patrol one evening, the officer shot an innocent bystander without provocation. 8 The
victim sued the officer's physician for medical malpractice but the trial
court dismissed the complaint based on the lack of privity between the
parties. 9
The issue on appeal was whether a showing of privity remained a
condition precedent to maintaining an action in negligence against a
physician.' Reinforcing the professional privity requirement, the

48. Id. Other factors the court takes into consideration are the foreseeability of harm,
nexus between the defendants conduct and the sustained injury, "moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm." Id.
49. Id. at 1170.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. See supra notes 27-38 & 39-51 and accompanying text.
53. 580 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
54. Id.; see also Greenberg, supra note 35, at 254-55 (discussing Florida's refusal to adopt
a Tarasoff duty that would force psychiatrists to warn third parties of impending danger from
a patient).
55. 580 So. 2d at 160. In order to remove the tumor, the patient underwent a craniotomy.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. The appellant was a member of the public at large. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Joseph court agreed with the trial court's dismissal of the complaint and
affirmed. In its decision, the court failed to specify the exact legal
theory of the appellant, justifying the outcome based on the lack of
privity between the doctor and victim." Thus, the court implicitly
suggested that in the absence of a contractual relationship, a physician
owes no duty of care to a third party, regardless of the legal theory
under which the claimant is proceeding.62 In short, the court that
determined appellant's failure to show privity warranted dismissing the
complaint, keeping with the requirement that at least near privity be
shown before an action can be maintained against a professional.'
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court followed the prior
trend of Hofinann and McAbee by imposing a duty on a physician to
warn a patient of the possibility that a disease was genetically
transferred to her children.' The court began its analysis with a
discussion of duty in general, reasoning that in Florida defendants owe
a duty of care whenever creating a "foreseeable zone of risk" which
could result in harm to*others." The court noted that Florida Statutes
provide for the particular duty of care owed by physicians to their
patients.' Thus, the court held that physicians have a duty to warn of
a possible genetic transference if the statutory standard, as established
by expert testimony, would require a reasonable health care provider to
give such a warning.67
Next, the instant court had to determine whether this legal duty
extended to the children of the patient.68 Noting that the traditional rule
required privity between the plaintiff and professional,69 the court
61. Id. The court noted that the action was for medical malpractice and negligence, but
failed to mention whether the appellant had argued that the case fit within an exception to the
privity rule. The court simply stated that for the appellant to maintain a cause of action against
the doctor, privity and a breach of duty had to exist. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id.; see also Forlaw v. Fitzer, 456 So. 2d 432, 435-36 (Fla. 1984) (holding that doctors
who prescribe controlled drugs to known addicts without having acted in bad faith or beyond
the scope of practice are not liable for injuries to third parties injured by the addict's abuse of
the drugs); Greenwald v. Grayson, 189 So: 2d 204, 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (holding that parties
who were not in physician-patient relationship with doctor could not recover for alleged
negligence in performance of medical services).
64. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 282.
65. Id. at 280 (citing McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. 1992)).
66. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 766.102 (1989)). The statute places a burden on the plaintiff
to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the physician breached "the prevailing professional
standard of care" followed by similar health care providers in the same field. Id.
67. Id. at 281.
68. Id. at 282.
69. Id. at 281 (citing Joseph, 580 So. 2d at 160; Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446
(Fla. 3d DCA 1991)).
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examined past decisions in which the privity rule was abrogated because
the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the prevailing standard of
care.7' For example, the court cited the previously discussed McAbee7'
decision in which an attorney's negligent advice resulted in the
reduction of the plaintiffs inheritance.72 The other cases upon which
the instant court relied concerned applications of the intended benefit
doctrine to various commercial transactions in which professional
negligence caused certain intended beneficiaries to sustain economic
damages.73 Creating an exception to the privity rule, the court set forth
a new test for third party claims: "when the prevailing standard of care
creates a duty that is obviously for the benefit of certain identified third
parties and the physician knows of the existence of those third parties,
then the physician's duty runs to those third parties."74 Under the new
test the physician owed a duty of care directly to the petitioner despite
the absence of privity.75 Satisfying this duty merely required the doctor
to inform the patient that the children should be tested.76
In effect, the instant decision analogized a lawyer's negligence in
drafting a will to the respondent's failure to warn of the possible genetic
transference of the deadly carcinoma.77 The court stated "the alleged
70. Id. (citing Baskerville-Donovan Eng'rs v. Pensacola Exec. House Condo. Ass'n, 581
So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 1991); First Florida Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990);
First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Serv. Co., 457 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1984)); see also McAbee,
340 So. 2d at 1168.
71. 340 So. 2d 1167.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing Baskerville-Donovan Eng'rs v. Pensacola Exec. House Condo. Ass'n, 581
So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 1991); First Florida Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990);
First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Serv. Co., 457 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1984)); see also McAbee,
340 So. 2d at 1168.
74. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 1168.
75. Id.
76. Id. The court specifically limited the doctor's duty to warning the patient, not actually
warning the child. Id. One reason for this limitation was the court's concern with overburdening
a doctor. Id. The court stated that "[t]o require the physician to seek out and warn various
members of the patient's family would often be difficult or impractical and would place too
heavy a burden upon the physician." Id. Thus, the patient becomes an intermediary who
"ordinarily can be expected to pass on the warning." Id. Consequently, the court extended a legal
duty to third parties without providing a mechanism which insures they receive the warning.
Furthermore, in light of the Patedecision, Florida now has a tripartite analysis to determine who
the physician has a duty to warn in a given case: First, doctors have a duty to warn family
members when treating patients with a communicable disease. Hofinann, 241 So. 2d at 753.
Second, if the patient suffers from a genetic disease the doctor must warn the patient only, not
the susceptible family member. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 282. Third, a psychiatrist has no duty to
warn potential third party victims of a patient's hostile intentions. Boyton v. Burglass, 590 So.
2d 446, 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
77. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 281.
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prevailing standard of care was obviously developed for the benefit of
the patient's children. . . ."' It failed to clarify, however, why the
prevailing standard of care was developed for the children and exactly
which benefits children receive from parental medical examinations.
In most instances, an individual consults a physician to determine a
state of health, not to inquire about possible genetic consequences. The
flow of benefits move directly from doctor to patient, third party
concerns being marginal. In contrast, when an attorney prepares a will
the benefits flow directly to the third party; the instrument usually
transfers some type of asset from testator to legatee.79 The tangible
benefit to be received in the future explains why the prevailing standard
of care was developed for the benefit of the legatee.
In the instant case, it is more difficult to identify a similar benefit
received'by the petitioner when her mother consulted the respondentphysician. Presumably, the instant court was premising its analysis on
the intangible benefit received by the family unit when one of its*
members seeks medical treatment from a physician or on the family's
reliance on the physician to warn. If expert testimony established that
the standard of care was developed on behalf of the children only
because of the foreseeability of the disease transferance, then it is
unlikely the children received any benefit at all. In any event, the court
failed to articulate what it perceived as the benefit conferred on the
petitioner, or any other explanation as to Why the prevailing standard of
care was developed on her behalf.
Moreover, although the intended benefit analysis may allow
previously unavailable recovery for family members, it will maintain the
practical effect of the privity rule by precluding claims for malpractice
brought by third parties who are not in near privity with the physician.
It may be arguable, that an adult child benefits from a parental medical
examination or that the prevailing standard of care was developed on
behalf of that child."0 However, in no circumstance will a victim of
medical malpractice who is unrelated to the patient be able to fit within
the instant court's exception to the privity rule. Only identified family
members will be able to recover under the Pate analysis." In this respect, the court's reasoning follows the holding of Hofinann,s2 where
78. Id. at 282.
79. See McAbee, 340 So. 2d at 1169 (quoting Heyer, 449 P.2d at 164-65).
80. See Pate, 661 So. 2d at 282.
81. Id. The court assured that only family members will be able to recover by requiring
the doctor to be aware of the identified third party. Id. Presumably, had the petitioner's mother
never informed the physician that she had children, the doctor would not owe the petitioner any
duty of care.
82. Hofnann, 241 So. 2d at 753.
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the duty was also limited to family members. 3
Quite possibly, the instant court used the intended benefit analysis as
a means to allow petitioner's action to move forward, while at the same
time retaining the privity rule for the claims of other third parties. The
decision to exclude non-family members may have been motivated by
the court's concern with the difficulty of defining the class of third
parties to be protected from physician negligence. Limiting recovery to
family members alleviates this problem by narrowing the class of
potential claimants. However, by excluding non-family members, the
instant decision may prevent some foreseeable victims from recovering
in tort for a physician's malpractice. 4 Take for example a physician
who prescribes medication that impairs driving ability, but fails to warn
the patient of the potential side effects. 5 If the patient subsequently
injures an innocent motorist in an automobile accident, any recovery by
the motorist from the physician would be precluded by the privity
rule.86 Yet, requiring the doctor to caution the patient may have prevented the injury in the first place. 7 Under the Pate analysis the
outcome is the same; the plaintiff would still be foreclosed from
bringing suit8 despite the foreseeability that injury may occur. The
third party would be neither an identified beneficiary of the standard of
care, nor an individual of whom the doctor is aware. 9
In addition to limiting recovery to family members, the instant
decision may reflect the court's desire to apply the intended benefit
analysis to most professional malpractice claims in which the parties are
not in privity of contract.' To a significant extent, the instant court
predicated the respondents' liability on a series of cases involving

83. Id. But see Gill v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 337 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1976) (expanding a physician's duty to warn of contagious infections beyond the realm
of immediate family members to include other patients within the same hospital room).
84. See Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 369-70 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
85. Id. at 365; see also Robert P. Giacolone, Note, Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. &
Medical Center: The Treatment of a Third Party Plaintiffin a Medical Context, 38 DEPAUL L.
REV. 749, 758-62 (1989) (discussing physician liability to third party plaintiffs). But see Forlaw
v. Fitzer, 456 So. 2d 432, 435-36 (Fla. 1984) (refusing to allow a third party claim against a
physician for negligently prescribing dangerous medication).
86. Gooden, 651 S.W.2d at 365.
87. See id. at 369. In the actual case the Texas appellate court ruled that the physician did
have a duty to warn the patient not to drive while on the medication. Id. at 370.
88. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 282.
89. For an excellent example of a third party being denied recovery for physician
malpractice, see Werner v. Varner, 659 So. 2d 1308, 1310-11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (denying
recovery based on the Pate analysis to a plaintiff who was rear-ended by a driver who was
taking dangerous medication).
90. See Pate, 661 So. 2d at 282.
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business transactions which were intended to confer a benefit on third
parties.9" The most obvious example was the court's reliance on the
negligent will drafting case.' Other cases discussed by the instant court
included a negligent title search93 and accountant malpractice which
both caused intended beneficiaries of the agreements to sustain
economic damages.94 Other jurisdictions take an opposite approach by
tailoring liability to the type of professional being sued.95 Professional
liability to third parties not in privity of contract should be tailored to
the type of malpractice at issue because the damages invoke distinct
policy concerns. For example, the economic loss suffered by a
disappointed will beneficiary does not compare to the devastating
physical injury visited upon a victim of medical malpractice. In order to
spread the loss sustained by such victims, a more flexible approach than
the intended benefit analysis may be necessary.
Rather than applying the intended benefit test, the instant court could
have abrogated the privity rule altogether and applied a straight-forward
negligence 96 test to determine the scope of the respondent's duty.97
The foreseeability element of duty, much like the privity rule, would
limit physician liability to third parties.9" Physicians would not owe "a
duty to the world";99 only identifiable individuals or groups within a
foreseeable zone of danger could recover."° Simultaneously, third
party victims of medical malpractice would be afforded the opportunity
to recover from the cause-in-fact tort feasor,'0 in most instances a
defendant with a greater economic capacity to bear the loss.
In the instant case, the negligence test would have probably produced
the same result as the intended benefit test. Assuming the truth of
petitioner's allegations,"°2 the foreseeable risk of harm would justify

91. Id. at 281.
92. Id. (citing McAbee, 340 So. 2d at 1167).
93. Id. (citing First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Serv. Co., 457 So. 2d 467 (Fla.
1984)).
94. Id. (citing First Florida Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990)).
95. See Ward, supra note 18, at 117.
96. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 30, at 164. The tort of negligence
consists of four basic elements: (1) The defendant has a duty to conform to a certain standard
of care as to prevent posing unreasonable risks to others; (2) The defendant fails to observe this
duty; (3) This failure proximately causes the harm; and (4) The defendant's conduct causes
damage. See id. at 164-65.
97. See Kelley, supra note 17, at 501.
98. See Gooden, 651 S.W.2d at 369-70.
99. See KEETON E' AL., supra note 13, § 53, at 357.
100. See Threlkel, 640 So. 2d at 185 (quoting McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502-03).
101. Contra id. at 186.
102. Appellant alleged that a reasonable health care provider in a similar situation would
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imposing a duty on the respondent to warn the patient. In discovering
the hereditary nature of the patient's disease, the respondent physician
placed his patient's children within a foreseeable zone of danger.3
The burden to warn the patient was slight"" and timely warning could
have arrested the growth of the carcinoma. 5 Thus, the respondent's
failure to warn may have increased the deadly effects of the disease
thereby shortening petitioner's life." 6
Overall, a traditional negligence analysis provides courts with
considerable flexibility without exposing professionals to unlimited
liability. The element of duty is a matter of law for the judge to
determine by balancing foreseeability °7 with various other factors."
This in turn allows the court to screen out attenuated cases where a
reasonable person could not anticipate the risk of harm.'" A court's
decision to impose a duty of care, therefore, will usually depend on the
foreseeability of the plaintiff."' On the contrary, the intended benefit
analysis may deny recourse to meritorious claims despite the
foreseeability of the plaintiff.
The Florida Supreme Court's approach in evaluating professional
malpractice claims reflects a fear of subjecting physicians and other
professionals to unlimited liability. As other societal concerns outweigh
these fears, the future may render the privity rule obsolete with respect
to claims of medical malpractice. In turn, physicians would be liable for
any harm inflicted upon foreseeable plaintiffs. The instant decision
supports the trend of abandoning privity, but employs an intended
benefit test"' that allows recovery only in the most narrow of
circumstances. Consequently, medical malpractice suits will be
dismissed at the outset whenever the injured party is not at least in near
privity with the physician.

have warned the patient of the possibility of a genetic transference. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 279.
103. Id. at 282.
104. See Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 401 (I11.1987)
(Simon, J., dissenting) (discussing the slight burden for doctors to inform patients of prescription
drug side effects).
105. See Pate, 661 So. 2d at 279.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 53, at 359.
109. See generally id. at 356-59 (discussing the general notion of duty in tort law).
110. Id.
111. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 282.
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